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1 Introduction
Income poverty reduction is a major political objective, both at national and
international levels. In the past decade, policy makers such as the EU Com-
mission or the World Bank have adopted quantified poverty reduction targets.1
These targets are based on income poverty measures, which are composed of
two elements: a poverty line and an index (Sen, 1976). A poverty line specifies
the income threshold below which individuals are considered to be poor. An
index aggregates the poverty of all individuals in a society and, hence, allows
us to compare poverty in different societies.
There exist two central approaches for measuring income poverty, absolute
poverty and relative poverty. They differ in the type of poverty line used. An
absolute line has its income threshold independent of the standard of living
whereas a relative line’s income threshold evolves as a constant fraction of the
standard of living. These two types of lines aim at capturing different depriva-
tions. On the one hand, absolute poverty refers to the idea of subsistence. An
individual is absolutely poor if her income is not sufficient to satisfy several of
her basic needs, such as being sufficiently nourished. In a first approximation,
the real cost of subsistence is absolute as it does not depend on standards of
living. For example, 100 grams of rice contain the same amount of calories in
New-York or in New-Delhi. On the other hand, relative poverty refers to the
ideas of social participation or inclusion. An individual is relatively poor if her
income is not sufficient to engage in the everyday life of her society (Townsend,
1979; Sen, 1983). The real cost of not being excluded from social participation
is relative as it depends on standards of living. The archetypical example is that
of the linen shirt (Smith, 1776). Adam Smith observed that in the England of
his time people would be too ashamed to appear in public without wearing a
linen shirt, which he argued was not the case in the Roman Empire that had a
lower standard of living.2
Many policy makers aim at reducing both the absolute and relative poverties.
These two objectives appear for example in the poverty reduction target of the
EU Commission or in the new twin goals of the World Bank.3 Against absolute
poverty policy makers implement pro-growth policies, which typically reward
efforts at the potential cost of increasing inequalities. Increasing the income of
a poor individual improves her absolute poverty but increasing the inequality
she experiences worsens her relative poverty. Against relative poverty they
implement redistributive policies, which may distort incentives. Of course, not
1See World Bank (2015) or European Commission (2015).
2The normative foundations for taking a relativist approach in poverty measurement are
reviewed in Ravallion (2008). For instance, Sen (1983) made the case that an absolute level
in the space of capabilities translates into a relative level in the space of resources. Townsend
(1979) discussed how individuals not having the resources for obtaining the living conditions
that are widely encouraged in their society would be excluded from ordinary living patterns,
customs and activities. Runciman (1966) pointed out that the comparison of own income
with incomes of better-off individuals creates a feeling of deprivation.
3In its EU2020 strategy, the EU Commission targets to reduce by 20 millions the number of
individuals that are at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE). The AROPE individuals
are inter alia those individuals that are at risk of poverty (relative poverty) or are severely
materially deprived (absolute poverty). In 2013, the World Bank committed itself to twin
goals: eliminating extreme poverty (absolute poverty) and boosting shared prosperity (relative
poverty). The second objective has a clear relative flavor since it is defined as raising the living
standards of the bottom 40% of individuals in any given country.
2
all policies induce a trade-off between growth and equality. Nevertheless, one
policy seldom dominates all the alternative policies in both dimensions.
As the two objectives are not always aligned, policy makers must regularly
arbitrate between them. Trading-off absolute and relative poverty amounts to
answering the following question: when does unequal growth alleviate income
poverty? A country experiences unequal growth if its economic growth goes
along with an increase in income inequality. That is, all individuals get more
resources but the additional resources go disproportionately more to the middle
class and the rich than to the poor.
One serious difficulty is that the two measurement approaches make opposite
extreme judgments on unequal growth. Hence, they evaluate very differently
the merits of development programs leading to unequal growth. On the one
hand, absolute measures evaluate growth positively, regardless of its distribu-
tion. On the other hand, relative measures judge positively any reduction in
the inequality experienced by the poor, regardless of the poor’s income level.
Clearly, neither absolute measures nor relative measures are able to make this
trade-off. Measuring both forms of poverty in parallel does not solve the issue
since, more often than not, the two approaches yield opposite conclusions.4
This paper proposes a new way to measure poverty that combines the ab-
solute and relative aspects of income poverty. Previous attempts to develop
such a measure followed two different routes. One route measures both forms
of poverty in parallel before looking for a way to aggregate them (Atkinson
and Bourguignon, 2001; Anderson and Esposito, 2013). Unfortunately, this ap-
proach is confronted to several difficulties, including double counting issues. The
other route aims at developing a single measure based on a poverty line making
the trade-off between the absolute and relative aspects of income. So far, this
second route has mostly focused on defining new poverty lines. The most influ-
ential proposals of such endogenous lines are the hybrid lines (Foster, 1998) and
the weakly relative lines (Ravallion and Chen, 2011). Surprisingly, the indices
to use in combination with an endogenous line have not been rigorously studied.
In empirical applications (Chen and Ravallion, 2013), the default practice is to
use an endogenous line in combination with an index derived for absolute lines,
such as the popular Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) indices (Foster et al., 1984).
As shown in the paper, there is a serious limitation associated with measures
composed of an endogenous line and an FGT index. These endogenous measures
weigh the absolute and relative aspects of income poverty in a questionable way.
They may consider that absolutely poor individuals in low-income countries are
less poor than relatively poor individuals in middle- and high-income countries.
The problem is so serious that these endogenous measures may conclude that
there is more poverty in the latter countries than in low-income countries. In
the application, these measures deem Brazil equally or more poor than Ivory
Coast in 2010. Even if income inequality was larger in Brazil than in Ivory
Coast, such judgment could be seriously questioned given that mean income in
Brazil was more than four times larger than that of Ivory Coast. Moreover,
22.7 % of individuals in Ivory Coast lived on less than $1.25 a day – the World
Bank’s threshold for extreme poverty (Ravallion et al., 2009) – but only 5.4%
in Brazil.
4A common practice is to use absolute measures in low- and middle-income countries and
relative measures in high-income countries. Official national poverty definitions mostly follow
this practice (Ravallion, 2012) that leads to extreme judgments as explained above.
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Why do measures combining an endogenous line with an FGT index yield
this debatable conclusion? FGT indices implicitly attribute to each individual a
value of individual poverty that depends only on her normalized income, i.e. her
income divided by the income threshold in her society. In 2010, an individual
living on $1 a day in Ivory Coast has the same normalized income as an indi-
vidual living on $3.6 a day in Brazil for the weakly relative line used by Chen
and Ravallion (2013). As a result, FGT indices attribute to both the same indi-
vidual poverty. This conclusion ignores that, unlike the latter, the individual in
Ivory Coast is below the threshold for extreme poverty. Being extremely poor
is not reflected in normalized incomes. Hence, an extremely poor individual
in Ivory Coast can be deemed less poor than a non-extremely poor individual
in Brazil. This problem is not limited to indices based on normalized incomes
but is rather pervasive. It also affects indices based on absolute gaps, i.e. the
distance between the threshold and the individual income.
This paper proposes a new index combining the absolute and relative aspects
of income poverty. In order to avoid the problem faced by standard indices, I
depart from individual poverty comparisons based on normalized incomes or on
absolute gaps. To begin with, I define an absolute poverty threshold, which
in the application is fixed at $1.25 a day. Below this absolute threshold, an
individual is deemed absolutely poor and her individual poverty does not depend
on the standard of living in her society. For instance, two individuals living with
$1.25 a day in Ivory Coast and Brazil contribute identically to poverty in their
respective countries. Then, I define the endogenous poverty line above the
absolute threshold. An individual above the absolute threshold but below the
endogenous line is deemed relatively poor. Her individual poverty depends on
the standard of living in her society. In the application, an individual living on
$2 a day in Ivory Coast, where the mean is $3 a day, contributes identically to
poverty as an individual living on $6.8 a day in Brazil, where the mean is $13.8
a day. The constraints I impose on individual poverty comparisons imply that
absolutely poor individuals are always considered poorer than relatively poor
individuals. This judgment is in line with largely shared intuitions, as appeared
from questionnaire studies run all over the world (Corazzini et al., 2011).
I define a family of extended FGT poverty indices that meets the new con-
straints on individual poverty comparisons. For a given value of the absolute
threshold this family depends on two parameters, one of which is the poverty
aversion parameter. I investigate which members of this new family satisfy
compelling properties. The result shows that a unique index satisfies two basic
properties. One property is classical and requires that a progressive transfer
between two poor individuals does not increase poverty. The other property
is new and specific to indices based on endogenous lines. It requires that de-
stroying part of the income of a poor individual does not reduce poverty. This
property excludes all values of poverty aversion except the one associated to the
Poverty Gap Ratio.
The index characterized is new and inherits the properties of the constraints
put on individual poverty comparisons. That is, absolutely poor individuals are
distinguished from relatively poor individuals and the former are always con-
sidered poorer than the latter. Being additive, the new index is decomposable
between the respective contributions of absolutely and relatively poor individ-
uals. This last feature simplifies the analysis of the evolution of poverty and its
communication.
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Finally, a poverty measure based on the new index is applied to World
Bank data. This application illustrates that the judgments obtained from the
new measure are more in line with general intuitions than those obtained with
standard measures. For instance, the new measure deems Brazil less poor than
Ivory Coast. In a second step, the new measure is used to assess the evolution
of poverty in several countries that experienced unequal growth. Urban China
constitutes a prominent example because it experienced over the period 1990
– 2010 a strong growth together with a sharp increase in inequality. The new
measure concludes that poverty in urban China was reduced by about 75% over
this period. By decomposing the measure, one can see that this improvement
almost entirely rests on the drastic reduction in absolute poverty. Absolute
poverty accounted for about two-third of income poverty in 1990, but less than
10% in 2010. This shows that if the main issue in urban China was absolute
poverty in 1990, it has become relative poverty in 2010. Studying different
countries shows that the measure may yield different judgments on unequal
growth. Over the period 1990 – 2010, income poverty did not change in Mexico
as the reduction in absolute poverty was compensated by the increase in relative
poverty. Over the period 1996 – 2010, unequal growth has lead to an increase
in poverty in Hungary where the impact on relative poverty was dominant. In
general, whether unequal growth reduces the poverty measure or not depends
on the initial importance of absolute poverty.
The paper is organized as follows. The framework, the limitation associated
to FGT indices and the family of extended FGT indices are presented in Section
2. The new index proposed is characterized and discussed in Section 3. Other
income standards than the mean are discussed in Section 4. The empirical
illustration is presented in Section 5. I conclude in Section 6.
2 General Framework
2.1 Notation and definitions
Let an income distribution y := (y1, . . . , yn) be a list of non-negative incomes
sorted in non-decreasing order (y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yn). All incomes are expressed in
real terms. That is, inflation effects and purchasing power differences have been
removed. Mean income y :=
∑
yi
n
is the income standard capturing the standard
of living in a distribution. This choice and the robustness of the results for other
income standards are discussed in Section 4. Letting N := {n ∈ N|n ≥ 3}, the
set of income distributions considered is Y :=
{
y ∈ RN+
}
.
An endogenous poverty line is defined by its threshold function z : R+ → R+,
a continuous function specifying the income threshold z(y) associated to y.
Individual i qualifies as poor if yi < z(y). The number of poor individuals is
denoted by q. As income distributions are sorted, if i ≤ q then individual i is
poor.
Endogenous lines generalize many types of poverty lines. An absolute lines is
defined by a constant threshold z∗ ∈ R++. A relative line has its threshold evolve
as a constant fraction of the income standard, e.g. z(y) = 12y. Foster (1998)
proposes hybrid lines, which feature a constant income elasticity ρ ∈ [0, 1].5
5For a given income standard, letting za be the threshold of an absolute line and zr be the
threshold of a relative line, the hybrid threshold is given by zh = z
ρ
az
1−ρ
r .
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This income elasticity can be interpreted as the extent to which poor individuals
should share the benefits of economic growth for not becoming poorer. Absolute
lines have an income elasticity of zero and relative lines have an income elasticity
of one, representing two extreme views on this parameter.6 A different proposal
by Ravallion and Chen (2011) suggests using weakly relative lines, whose income
elasticity is zero for low-income countries and then increases with standards of
living, tending ultimately to a value of one.
I define monotonic lines, a subset of endogenous lines that excludes absolute
lines but includes relative lines, hybrid lines and weakly relative lines. Let s(y)
denote the slope of line z at mean income y. Formally, s(y) is the first order
derivative of function z at y.7 Restriction 1 excludes strictly decreasing lines
(0 ≤ s(y)) and lines exhibiting an excessive sensitivity to the mean (s(y) ≤ 1).8
Restriction 2 requires that the slope is strictly positive for at least one value of
mean income y∗ for which poverty-free income distributions exist (z(y∗) ≤ y∗).
For non-absolute lines, these two restrictions are arguably very mild. The defi-
nition of monotonic lines includes almost all non-decreasing endogenous lines.
Definition 1 (Monotonic line).
An endogenous poverty line z is monotonic if
1. its slope s(y) ∈ [0, 1] for all y ≥ 0, and
2. there exists y∗ ≥ 0 with z(y∗) ≤ y∗ such that s(y∗) > 0.
Throughout, I assume that a monotonic line z has been selected. For a given
line z, an index ranks all distributions in Y . Let a poverty index be a function
P : Y → [0, 1] representing a complete ranking on Y . For any two y, y′ ∈ Y ,
there is strictly more poverty in y than in y′ if P (y) > P (y′), and weakly more
if P (y) ≥ P (y′). Observe that y and y′ could be distributions associated to
two different countries or to the same country at different points in time. The
properties of an index P associated with a monotonic line z are investigated in
the remainder of the paper.
2.2 Limitation of FGT indices
As shown in the nice review of Zheng (1997), many different poverty indices have
been proposed. In spite of this diversity, virtually all empirical applications use
poverty indices belonging to the famous FGT family.
PFGT (y) :=
1
n
q∑
i=1
(
1−
yi
z(y)
)α
. (1)
The FGT family has a unique parameter α ∈ [0,∞), which can be interpreted
as poverty aversion. The larger α, the higher is the priority given by the index
6Madden (2000) estimates empirically an upper-bound for the value of this parameter using
Irish data.
7Function z is assumed continuous but need not be differentiable everywhere. At any y
at which z is not differentiable, we define the slope as s(y) := limx→y+ ∂z(x), where ∂ is the
symbol for first order derivative and the symbol + indicates that the limit consider values
strictly larger than y.
8If s(y) > 1, then a non-poor individual whose income is equal to the income threshold
could become poor after the distribution of an equal increment to all individuals.
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to individuals at the bottom of the income distribution. This family allows for
a wide variety of poverty aversion choices and admits the Head-Count Ratio
(HC) and the Poverty Gap Ratio (PGR) as particular cases:
HC(y) :=
q
n
for α = 0,
PGR(y) :=
1
n
q∑
i=1
(
1−
yi
z(y)
)
for α = 1.
Being additive, FGT indices compute the average of the values of individual
poverty in a distribution. The value of individual poverty is zero for non-poor
individual. For poor individuals, this value is returned by the function dFGT :
R+ × R+ → [0, 1], defined as
dFGT (yi, y) =
(
1−
yi
z(y)
)α
.
Any poor individual is attributed by FGT indices a value of individual
poverty that depends only on her normalized income, i.e. her income divided
by the income threshold in her society.
The direct link between individual poverty and normalized income has strong
implications. This is true for any type of poverty line. If the line is absolute,
then the individual poverty depends only on own income. Therefore, any small
increase in income reduces individual poverty, regardless of the progress achieved
by the rest of society. If the line is relative, then the individual poverty depends
only on the relative income yi
y
. Therefore, multiplying all incomes in a distribu-
tion by a common factor does not affect individual poverties. More generally,
if the line is monotonic, then the normalized income does not reflect whether a
person is above or below an absolute threshold, such as the threshold for extreme
poverty. Therefore, extremely poor individuals in Ivory Coast are attributed the
same individual poverty as non-extremely poor individuals in Brazil, where the
mean income and the income threshold are larger.
This last point is illustrated by considering incomes in different distributions
that are implicitly deemed equivalent by FGT indices. Assume that individual
i lives in Ivory Coast and individual j in Brazil. The respective mean incomes
in these countries are denoted by yIvo and yBra. For FGT indices, i has the
same individual poverty as j if
yi
z(yIvo)
=
yj
z(yBra)
.
For the weakly relative line of Chen and Ravallion (2013), in 2010, an in-
dividual living on $1 a day in Ivory Coast has the same normalized income
as an individual living on $3.6 a day in Brazil. If $1.25 a day is considered
as the threshold for absolute poverty, Figure 1.a shows that some absolutely
poor individuals in Ivory Coast are considered less poor than some relatively
poor individuals in Brazil. Considering an absolutely poor individual less poor
than a relatively poor individual violates largely shared intuitions, as appeared
from questionnaire studies run all over the world (Corazzini et al., 2011). As
a consequence, FGT indices lead to counter-intuitive poverty conclusions about
unequal growth, e.g. consider Brazil to be poorer than Ivory Coast.
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y¯Ivo
z
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b
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Figure 1: (a) The upper-graph shows, for a given weakly relative line z, the
implicit individual poverty comparisons made by FGT indices. Each line below
z features constant normalized incomes. The dots mark the different incomes
in each distribution. Given the extremely poor individual in Ivory Coast and
the relatively poor individual in Brazil are on the same line, they are attributed
equal individual poverties. (b) The lines in the lower-graph show the individual
poverty comparisons implicit in the definition of the equivalent income function.
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This problem is not specific to FGT indices but affect virtually all poverty
indices. All indices based on normalized incomes yi
z(y) and all indices based on
absolute gaps z(y)− yi are affected.
9
2.3 Fixing FGT indices
I have shown that FGT indices provide very counter-intuitive poverty judgments
when associated with a monotonic line. Indeed, FGT indices imply strange
comparisons of individual poverty across societies having different standards of
living. In this section I propose a new family of indices implying more plausible
comparisons of individual poverty.
FGT indices have been widely used partly because of their simple exponential
mathematical expression whose parameter is interpretable as poverty aversion.
The new family of indices keeps this simple exponential expression but implies
different comparisons of individual poverty. Since this family includes FGT
indices as particular cases, I call its members extended FGT indices.
Before defining the family of extended FGT indices, I present the alternative
comparisons of individual poverties on which the family is constructed. These
comparisons are encapsulated in the definition of a particular function that I call
the equivalent income function. This function is defined in two parts separated
by a threshold that can be interpreted as the threshold defining absolute poverty.
Let za ∈ R+ be the threshold defining absolute poverty. This threshold is
chosen to be everywhere below the monotonic line z. Denoting by z0 := z(0) the
intercept of the line, the choice of za is such that za < z0. Any poor individual
whose income is strictly above za is deemed relatively poor. As za < z0, some
individuals in low income countries may be deemed relatively poor. That is,
the cost of social participation is strictly positive even in low-income societies.
Ravallion (2012) defends this point by giving several examples of expenditures
playing a social role in low-income countries such as festivals and celebrations.
For a poor individual, the equivalent income at another mean income yr
is the amount yielding the same individual poverty as she experiences, but
at yr. The definition of the equivalent income function is given in equation
(2) and illustrated in Figure 1.b. This definition is in two parts. One part
specifies the equivalent income for absolutely poor individuals and the other
part for relatively poor individuals. Only the individual poverty of relatively
poor individuals depends on standards of living. First, two absolutely poor
individuals are equally poor when they earn the same income, regardless of the
mean incomes in their respective societies. Then, two relatively poor individuals
are equally poor when their incomes feature the same normalized distance to za.
This definition implies that absolutely poor individuals are always considered
poorer than relatively poor individuals.
9More generally, all indices satisfying the Scale Invariance property (e.g. FGT indices) and
all indices satisfying the Translation Invariance property are affected. See Zheng (1997) for
formal definitions.
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Definition 2 (Equivalent income function at yr).
Take any yr ≥ 0. For all y ∈ Y and any poor individual i, the equivalent income
function er at yr is defined such that:
er(yi, y) = yi if yi ≤ z
a,
er(yi, y)− z
a
z(yr)− za
=
yi − z
a
z(y)− za
otherwise,
(2)
where za is the threshold for absolute poverty.
I define the new family such that any extended FGT index implies the in-
dividual poverty comparisons encapsulated in the equivalent income function
for a particular value of za. As soon as za is non-zero and the line is mono-
tonic, the definition of the equivalent income function makes it not possible
for extended FGT indices to have exponential expression at all values of mean
income.10 Therefore, any extended FGT index is based on the additional pa-
rameter yr, which is the reference value of mean income at which its expression
is exponential.
Definition 3 (Extended FGT Family).
Index P belongs to the extended FGT family if there exist yr ≥ 0 such that
P (y) :=
1
n
q∑
i=1
(
1−
er(yi, y)
z(yr)
)α
, (3)
where er is the equivalent income function at yr.
This family extends the FGT family in the sense that if za = 0, then this
family coincide with the family of FGT indices. The value of individual poverty
depends on the normalized equivalent income at yr, i.e. the equivalent income
at yr divided by the income threshold at yr:
d(yi, y) =
(
1−
er(yi, y)
z(yr)
)α
.
This family depends on three parameters, namely the poverty aversion α,
the reference mean income yr and the absolute threshold za. Selecting a par-
ticular index requires to fix the values of all three parameters. The selection of
an appropriate value for za is a normative choice that depends on the type of
poverty comparisons that are performed. Yet, given za, the values for parame-
ters α and yr must be still be selected. The next section shows that a unique
pair of values leads to an index satisfying two very basic properties.
3 The new index
The family of extended FGT indices is very large. Selecting a particular member
requires to fix the values for its three parameters. The choice of za should
10For FGT indices, the own income and the mean income define the individual poverty in
a linear way via the normalized income. The definition of the equivalent income function
makes the individual poverty depend non-linearly on the own income and the mean income.
Therefore, the mathematical expression of an index depends on the mean income at which it
is expressed.
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reflect the cost of a bundle of goods allowing to minimally satisfy basic human
needs. Therefore, the selection of an appropriate value for za can be made
relatively easily by the practitioner. Selecting a particular value of poverty
aversion is already more difficult, not to mention that of the reference mean
income.11 Fortunately, the values for the latter two parameters can be chosen
from two compelling ethical principles. In these sections I present the properties
encapsulating these ethical principles and the particular extended FGT index
that they jointly characterize.
3.1 Characterization
I require indices in the extended FGT family to respect two properties. For a
fixed value of za, Theorem 1 shows that a unique index satisfies both properties.
The first property is specific to poverty indices considering both the absolute
and relative aspects of income. In such a framework, increasing the income of an
individual entails a worse relative situation for the others. Poverty indices must
balance those gains and losses without giving excessive importance to relative
losses. Monotonicity in Income requires that decreasing the income of some
poor individual never leads to an unambiguous poverty reduction.
Poverty axiom 1 (Monotonicity in Income).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y , if yi < y
′
i < z(y
′) and y′j = yj for all j 6= i, then P (y) ≥ P (y
′).
When a poor individual’s income increases, her individual poverty decreases
as both her absolute and relative situation improve. Yet, the additional income
also increases the mean income and this may increase the income threshold. A
threshold’s increase may have two adverse effects. First, the individual poverties
of relatively poor individuals increase.12 Second, any individual whose income
is between the initial and the final values of the income threshold becomes
relatively poor. Monotonicity in Income requires that the positive impact of
such an income increase is dominant. Observe that the larger the number of
individuals, the smaller is the impact of a given income increase on the mean
income and, hence, on the individual poverties of the others.
It is worth stressing that the Head-Count Ratio, when combined with a
monotonic line, may conclude that destroying part of the income of a poor in-
dividual reduces poverty. The problem is illustrated in Table 1. The monotonic
line z is relative and has its threshold equal to 50% of mean income. The dis-
tribution B is obtained from the distribution A by decreasing the income of
the poor individual 1. Nevertheless, the HC concludes there is more poverty in
distribution A than in B as individual 2 is poor in A but not in B.
Table 1: Index HC violates Monotonicity in Income if the line is monotonic.
y1 y2 y3 z(y) HC(y)
Distribution A 2.5 3 12.9 3.1 23
Distribution B 2 3 12.9 2.9 13
11Unlike poverty aversion, the reference value for mean income has no clear normative
interpretation.
12The individual poverty of absolutely poor individuals is not affected as it is independent
on the income standard.
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The second property is a standard requirement that most poverty indices
characterized in the literature satisfy. Weak Transfer requires that a Pigou-
Dalton transfer taking place between two poor individuals never unambiguously
increases poverty.13 This property is still compelling when the income standard
is the mean income since balanced transfers do not alter the mean. As a result,
the individual poverties of individuals not involved in the transfer are preserved.
Poverty axiom 2 (Weak Transfer).
For all y, y′ ∈ Y and λ > 0, if yj − λ = y
′
j > y
′
k = yk +λ, z(y) > yj and y
′
i = yi
for all i 6= j, k, then P (y) ≥ P (y′).
I investigate which indices in the extended FGT family respect both prop-
erties. It is well-known that poverty indices satisfying Weak Transfer are based
on convex individual poverties. Monotonicity in Income is a new axiom in this
context and I show that it has a strong discriminative power.
Assume the value za of the absolute threshold has been fixed. In the ex-
tended FGT family, each value of poverty aversion defines a subfamily whose
members are parameterized by the reference mean income yr. For example, the
PGR at yr is the index for which the individual poverty function d is linear in
own income at mean income yr. The PGR at the origin (yr = 0) illustrated in
Figure 2 plays a key role in the remainder of this paper.
Theorem 1 formalizes the result showing that in the extended FGT family,
only the PGR at the origin satisfiesMonotonicity in Income andWeak Transfer .
Theorem 1 (Characterization of the PGR at the origin).
Let P be an index in the extended FGT family based on a monotonic line.
1. P satisfies Monotonicity in Income only if:
α = 1.
2. P satisfies Monotonicity in Income and Weak Transfer if and only if:
α = 1 and yr = 0,
that is, P is the PGR at the origin.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Claim 1 shows thatMonotonicity in Income is responsible for the largest part
of the result. First, among all values of poverty aversion, only the one associated
to the PGR is acceptable. This characterization of the poverty aversion’s value
is due to the exponential mathematical form of the extended FGT family. For
the case α < 1, when the income of a poor individual tends to the income
threshold, the priority granted to her over – say – an absolutely poor individual
tends to infinity. Therefore, when the income of an absolutely poor individual
increases, the individual poverty of the relatively poor individual close to the
income threshold is affected in an adverse way and the index concludes that
poverty has increased. The case α > 1 is plagued with the reversed problem.
13A Pigou-Dalton transfer is a progressive balanced transfer preserving the relative ranks
of the two individuals involved in the transfer.
12
1− z
a
z0
(a)
d(yi, 0)
1
0
yi
at y = 0
(b)
1
0 z(y1)za
at y = y1
yi
z0
d(yi, y
1)
1− z
a
z0
za
Figure 2: (a) Individual poverty values attributed by the PGR at the origin
as a function of yi for y = y
r = 0. (b) Individual poverty values attributed by
the PGR at the origin as a function of yi for y = y
1 with z(y1) > z0.
When the income of a poor individual tends to the income threshold, her priority
over the other poor individuals tends to zero. An increase in her income can
be negatively judged by the index. Second, not all members of the PGR at yr
subfamily satisfy Monotonicity in Income. If the monotonic line is linear, then
the PGR at yr satisfies the axiom if and only if yr is below an upper-bound
whose value depends on the parameters of the line and the absolute threshold.14
Claim 2 shows that Weak Transfer further restricts the acceptable members
of the PGR subfamily to a unique index. If the reference mean income is not
yr = 0, then there exist values of mean incomes at which the individual poverty
function d is concave, which violatesWeak Transfer . Here is the intuition for this
result. When drawn at the reference mean income, the graph of the individual
poverty function d is linear when α = 1, as shown in Figure 2.a for the case
yr = 0. When drawn at a larger mean income than the reference, its graph is
piecewise-linear and convex because the income threshold is then larger than
at the reference mean income, as shown in Figure 2.b for the case yr = 0.
If the reference value for mean income is not zero, then there exist values of
mean income at which the income threshold is lower than at the reference mean
income and the graph is piecewise-linear and concave.
The very sharp conclusions of Theorem 1 are valid for indices in the extended
FGT family. The robustness of the result outside this family is investigated in an
earlier version of this paper (Decerf, 2015). I show by means of an example that,
for other families, the discriminating power of Monotonicity in Income is less
strong. There is a range of poverty aversion values around the value associated
to the PGR for which the index satisfies this property. The PGR at the origin
still emerges as the focal index. Any other index satisfying Monotonicity in
Income and Weak Transfer must be close to the PGR at the origin.
If the absolute threshold za is non-zero, the PGR at the origin defines a new
index of poverty. I present this new index in the coming subsection.
14A linear poverty line has its income threshold defined as z(y) = sy + z0, where the slope
s ∈ [0, 1]. The proof for the existence of this upper-bound is in an earlier version of this paper
(Decerf, 2015).
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3.2 Presentation
Given an endogenous line z, how can the practitioner compute the index iden-
tified above? The first step is to fix the absolute threshold za. The value for
parameter za is selected to be a meaningful threshold for absolute material
deprivation for the empirical question tackled by the practitioner.
An important remark relates to the selection of the parameter za ∈ [0, z0).
Given z0, the larger za, the larger is the emphasis placed by P on poverty in low-
income countries. Formally, increasing za increases the equivalent incomes at
origin of relatively poor individuals. Hence, their individual poverties decrease.
Crucially, the larger the mean income in a given distribution, the larger is the
decrease in individual poverties. For instance, assume that two relatively poor
individuals living in countries with different income thresholds have the same
individual poverty for some value of za. For za
′
> za, the individual living in
the country with the larger income threshold is considered less poor than the
other individual. In contrast, changing za does not alter the equivalent incomes
at origin of absolutely poor individuals.
Consider the two extreme values for za. If za tends to z0, then the index
becomes the PGR based on an absolute line with threshold z0. In this case,
any two income distributions are compared based on the incomes of individuals
below z0. The individual poverties of relatively poor individuals – with income
between z0 and the income threshold – tend to zero. If instead za = 0, there
are no absolutely poor individuals and the index is the classical PGR below the
endogenous line, which only depends on normalized incomes. Clearly, the PGR
below the endogenous line places more emphasis on poverty in richer countries
than the PGR below the absolute line with threshold z0. These two limit values
for za are rather extreme and the value of za should not be selected near the
boundaries of [0, z0).
Once an appropriate za has been chosen, the second step is mechanical and
simply amounts to computing the mathematical expression of the index P . This
mathematical expression, illustrated in Figure 2, is the PGR at the origin
P (y) =
1
n
q∑
i=1
(
1−
e0(yi, y)
z0
)
,
where e0(yi, y) is the equivalent income at y
r = 0 and z0 is the intercept of
the endogenous line.
The classical PGR can be interpreted as the average percentage shortfall in
income, from the income threshold. The individual poverty attributed by the
new index is equal to the equivalent percentage shortfall at the origin. Therefore,
the new index’s interpretation is the average equivalent percentage shortfall at
the origin.
Interesting properties of the index
Besides satisfying Monotonicity in Income and Weak Transfer , the new index
has several interesting features.
First, the index makes a clear distinction between absolutely poor individuals
and relatively poor individuals. In contrast to standard indices, the latter are
never considered to be poorer than the former. This feature follows from the
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definition of the equivalent income function. For global poverty measurement,
this definition implies that:
• An extra dollar has the same impact on global poverty when it is given to
an absolutely poor individual in a low-income country as when it is given
to an absolutely poor individual in a middle-income country.
• An extra dollar has more impact on global poverty when it is given to a
relatively poor individual in a low-income country than when it is given to
a relatively poor individual in a middle-income country. Even if bringing
an individual from the subsistence threshold to the poverty threshold has
the same impact on her individual poverty in both countries, it is more
costly to do so in the middle-income country.
For the evolution of income poverty over time, the definition of er implies
that:
• Growth, however unequally distributed, decreases the individual poverties
of absolutely poor individuals.
• On the contrary, growth should not be too unequally distributed in order
for the individual poverties of relatively poor individuals to decrease.
A corollary of the last two bullet points is that this index concludes that growth,
if strong enough, eventually eradicates absolute poverty but not necessarily rela-
tive poverty. Whether the latter form of poverty eventually disappears depends
on the distributive aspects of growth.
Second, being additive, the index is decomposable between the respective
contributions of absolutely and relatively poor individuals. Letting qa denote
the number of absolutely poor individuals in the distribution, the index can be
decomposed as
P (y) =
1
n
q
a∑
i=1
(
1−
e0(yˆi, y)
z0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pa(y)
+
1
n
q∑
i=qa+1
(
1−
e0(yˆi, y)
z0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P r(y)
. (4)
As shown in the application, the decomposability simplifies the analysis of
the evolution of poverty and its communication. Before turning to the applica-
tion, next section discusses the choice of the mean as the income standard.
4 Income standard
I discuss in this section the choice of the income standard to which the poverty
line is sensitive. The choice of income standard is important because it de-
fines the channel through which the other individuals’ incomes affect individual
poverty. More specifically, it defines the distributional changes altering the in-
come threshold and, hence, the individual poverties. Poverty judgments depend
on the income standard used. If the literature on global poverty measurement
uses mean-sensitive lines (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2001; Chen and Ravallion,
2013), median-sensitive lines are often used in practice.15
15The AROP measure of the European Commission uses a median-sensitive line. The At
Risk of Poverty measure is the Head-Count Ratio based on a relative line whose threshold is
60 % of the median income.
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In practice, the income standard is not computed from administrative data
but often from random samples. The median is known to be more robust than
the mean in random samples (Cowell and Victoria-Feser, 1994). Hence, median-
sensitive lines have a less volatile income threshold. Therefore, median-sensitive
lines are considered superior to mean-sensitive lines when inequality is constant
over time.
However, unlike the mean, the median is affected by the inequality in the
distribution. de Mesnard (2007) has shown that median-sensitive indices behave
very counter-intuitively when income distributions experience an increase in
inequality. For instance, policies whose unique impacts are regressive transfers
from the middle class to the rich are deemed poverty-reducing. This issue is
particularly problematic in a World in which intra-country inequalities are on
the rise (Bourguignon, 2013). The evolution of the official poverty measure
in New-Zealand over the period 1981 – 1992 constitutes an illustration of the
problem. According to Easton (2002), the implementation of policies inducing
regressive transfers led to a decrease of the incomes of the bottom 80 % of
households. Nevertheless, the median-sensitive HC dropped due to the large
decline in median income and some institutions used these figures to argue that
the regressive policies were a success. Unsurprisingly, median-sensitive lines
yield extreme judgments on unequal growth. Provided that the median income
does not change, any unequal growth is deemed poverty reducing.
I have argued that the median income is not a good income standard for judg-
ing the evolution of poverty in countries experiencing unequal growth. Rather,
other income standards are preferable, such as the mean or a lower partial mean
(e.g. mean income among the 99% least rich individuals).16
How robust are the results to the choice of the income standards? I study
this question in an earlier version of this paper (Decerf, 2015). In a nutshell,
the answer goes as follows. Theorem 1 holds if the line is sensitive to a lower
partial mean, but not for median-sensitive lines. Monotonicity in Income con-
strains the median-sensitive line rather than the poverty aversion parameter.
The reason is that the poor individuals’ incomes do not affect the median if the
median is above the income threshold. Nevertheless, for any income standard,
classical FGT indices imply implausible cross-distributions individual poverty
comparisons. The particular equivalent income function proposed solves this
issue for any choice of income standard.
5 Empirical illustration
In this section, I apply the new index on World Bank data. First, using different
poverty measures, I compare poverty between several low-income low-inequality
countries and middle-income high-inequality countries. The judgments obtained
by a poverty measure based on the new index are more in line with general intu-
itions than those obtained by classical FGT measures. Second, I use the poverty
measure based on my index in order to evaluate whether the economic growth
16Some argue against the use of mean-sensitive lines that the mean is affected by “outliers”.
If the sensitivity to outliers is perceived as deeply problematic, then a lower partial mean offers
a good compromise. For example, the mean income among the 99% least rich individuals is
much less affected by outliers than the mean. The downside of such a partial mean is that
regressive redistributions benefiting the 1% richest individuals affect it.
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Figure 3: (a) Individual poverty comparisons associated to PEL. The en-
dogenous poverty line is z and the absolute threshold is za = $1.25 a day. (b)
Individual poverty comparisons associated to PGREL.
taking place over the last 20 years in several low- and middle-income countries
was poverty reducing in spite of the increase in intra-country inequalities. I
discuss the variables influencing the answer.
The data is taken from PovcalNet, a website built by the World Bank that
provides income and consumption data.17 This data is gathered from more than
850 surveys of randomly sampled households in 127 low- and middle-income
countries between 1981 and 2010. The frequency and precision of the surveys
vary from one country to another. In some countries, the surveys focus on in-
come, whereas in others on the value of total consumption. In order to permit
cross-country comparisons, the Bank translates the survey data by making use
of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates for household consump-
tion from the 2005 International Comparison Program. The national income
distributions presented in PovcalNet are estimated from the survey data. More
information about the data can be found in Chen and Ravallion (2013).18
5.1 A poverty measure based on the new index
This section demonstrates how to apply the new index. I assume that the
selected endogenous line has the following weakly relative definition, illustrated
in Figure 3:
z(y) = max{$2, $0.625+ 0.5y}.
Its income threshold is $2 a day in countries whose mean income is lower than
$2.75 a day. The World Bank considers that $2 a day is the threshold for income
poverty in developing countries. For mean incomes higher than $2.75 a day, this
line has a constant slope of one half. Observe that the intercept $0.625 of this
second part is positive. As a result, the line does not evolve as a constant
fraction of the mean.
This line is very close to that used by Chen and Ravallion (2013). The only
difference is that the income threshold for low-income countries used by these
17PovcalNet: the on-line tool for poverty measurement developed by the Development Re-
search Group of the World Bank. www.iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet.
18PovcalNet is the database used in Chen and Ravallion (2013).
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authors is $1.25 a day, considered by the World Bank as the threshold for ex-
treme poverty.19 For richer countries, these authors fit their line on national
thresholds. Their premise is that thresholds adopted at a country level reflect
a balance made between absolute and relative aspects of income. The endoge-
nous line selected is of course debatable but the objective is simply to pick a
reasonable line for illustration purposes.
I take za to be the threshold for extreme poverty: $1.25 a day. This threshold
was computed as an average of income thresholds in the fifteen poorest countries
of the World (Ravallion et al., 2009).20 Individuals earning less than $1.25 a
day are deemed absolutely poor and those earning more than $1.25 a day but
less than the endogenous threshold are deemed relatively poor. The poverty
measure based on the new index is denoted by PEL, where the superscript is
meant to indicate that it is based on the endogenous line.
Judgments based on PEL are compared with those obtained by four other
measures. Among the four alternative measures, three are based on the Head-
Count Ratio while the last is based on the Poverty Gap Ratio. The first measure,
HCAL, is the fraction of individuals whose income is below $1.25 a day. The
second, HCRL, is a relative measure corresponding to the fraction of individuals
whose income is below the relative line whose threshold is half the mean income.
This measure provides some information about the inequality in the distribution.
The third measure, HCEL, is the fraction of individuals whose income is below
the endogenous line defined above. The last measure, PGREL, is the classical
Poverty Gap Ratio below the endogenous line.
I comment on the relations existing between PEL and PGREL. For mean
incomes below $2.75 a day, the endogenous line is flat. Therefore, PEL returns
equal values as PGREL for very poor countries. Above $2.75 a day, PEL sys-
tematically returns lower values than PGREL because the normalized equivalent
incomes at origin of relatively poor agents are larger than their normalized in-
comes. Therefore, if distribution B has a larger mean income than distribution
A with yA = 2.75 and PEL concludes that there is more poverty in B than in A,
then PGREL draws the same conclusion. Index PGREL places more emphasis
on poverty in richer countries.
5.2 Empirical results
The data extracted from PovcalNet is used for computing the five poverty mea-
sures. First, I show that PEL makes poverty judgments on unequal growth that
are more in line with general intuitions than those of the other four measures.
Remember that for my purpose, the distributions of two countries can equally be
interpreted as two distributions corresponding to the same country at different
points in time.
Table 2 provides figures for six countries in 2010. The countries are sorted
in increasing order of mean income. Three low-income low-inequality countries
are considered, namely Ethiopia, Nepal and Ivory Coast. Their mean incomes
19It makes little sense for my purpose to consider that individuals whose income is $1.25 a
day have the same individual poverty than individuals at the poverty line in richer countries
since I assume that $1.25 a day is the threshold for absolute poverty.
20Many among these countries establish their national thresholds based on the cost of a
bundle of goods whose consumption guarantees to reach a minimal level of physical survival
(including a minimal nutrition level). Therefore this choice seems natural for za.
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amount to $2, $2.2 and $3 a day respectively and their Gini coefficients are 34%,
33% and 43%.21 Three middle-income high-inequality countries are considered,
namely Bolivia, South Africa and Brazil. Their mean incomes amount to $8.3,
$8.4 and $13.8 a day respectively and their Gini coefficients are 50%, 63% and
54%.
Table 2: Cross-country comparisons of poverty figures in 2010.
Countries Mean Gini HCAL HCRL HCEL PGREL PEL
Ethiopia 2.0 34 30.6 17.7 65.0 23.1 23.1
Nepal 2.2 33 24.8 18.5 56.3 18.7 18.7
Ivory Coast 3.0 43 22.7 30.0 47.6 18.3 17.4
Bolivia 8.3 50 13.4 43.3 48.3 25.3 16.5
South Africa 8.4 63 13.8 57.1 61.3 32.8 17.6
Brazil 13.8 54 5.4 43.1 46.5 22.1 11.7
All poverty measures and the Gini coefficients are expressed in %. Mean
incomes are expressed in $ a day (2005 PPP). Source: PovcalNet.
HCAL is strongly negatively correlated with mean income and HCRL is
strongly positively correlated with inequality, as measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient.22 HCRL concludes that middle-income countries, having a larger income
inequality, have by far the largest poverty. HCAL reaches the opposite conclu-
sion. Hence, it is difficult to balance the absolute and relative aspects of growth
on the sole basis of these two measures. The three measures based on the en-
dogenous line are more nuanced. PGREL places more emphasis on poverty
in richer countries and concludes that the two poorest countries are Bolivia
and South Africa. In contrast, the two poorest countries according to PEL are
low-income countries, namely Ethiopia and Nepal.
Pairwise comparisons illustrate the different judgments made by PEL, PGREL
and HCEL. PGREL and HCEL conclude that there is less – or approximately
equal – poverty in Ivory Coast than in Brazil, even if the fraction of abso-
lutely poor individuals is much higher in the former (22.7 %) than in the latter
(5.4%). In contrast, PEL places more emphasis on the absolute aspects of in-
come poverty and concludes that there is more poverty in Ivory Coast than
in Brazil. Oppositions of the same type can be found when comparing South
Africa with Nepal or Ivory Coast, or when comparing Brazil with Bolivia. Nev-
ertheless, PEL does not always follow the judgments of HCAL. For instance,
HCAL concludes that there is much less poverty in South Africa than in Nepal
or Ivory Coast. In contrast, acknowledging the very unequal income distribu-
tion in South Africa, PEL deems that those three countries have similar levels
of poverty.
Table 2 demonstrates that the poverty judgments drawn from PEL can be
radically different from those obtained with the other four measures. Moreover,
the judgments drawn from PEL seem to be in line with general intuitions. Next,
21The Gini coefficient is a popular measure of inequality. The larger the Gini coefficient, the
larger is inequality. The Gini coefficient’s values were obtained online from the World Bank
Poverty and Equity Database on the 24th of August 2015, www.povertydata.worldbank.org.
The Gini coefficient is measured in 2010 for Ethiopia and Nepal; in 2009 for Bolivia, South
Africa and Brazil and in 2008 for Ivory Coast.
22In the sample, the coefficients of correlations are -0.97 and 0.99 respectively.
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PEL is used in order to evaluate the impact of the unequal growth taking place
over the period 1990-2010 in different geographic entities.
Table 3 provides the before- and after-growth figures for five geographic
entities.23 All five geographic entities experienced an increase in mean income
together with an increase in inequality, as signaled by the evolution of HCRL.
PEL allows us to decompose the fraction of poor individuals (HCEL) between
those that are absolutely poor (HCAL) and those that are “only” relatively poor.
Furthermore, the figure for PEL can be decomposed between the contribution
of absolutely poor individuals (P a) and that of relatively poor individuals (P r).
These decompositions are illustrated in Figure 4 for urban China, the entity
that experienced the most drastic evolution over that period.
Table 3: Evaluation of several unequal growth experiences.
Geo Entity Year Mean HCRL HCAL HCEL PEL P
a
/PEL
World 1990 3.0 21.2 43.0 70.7 30.7 0.82
2010 4.9 26.4 20.8 52.7 17.7 0.66
Urban China 1990 1.9 9.1 23.4 61.2 18.9 0.62
2010 7.1 21.7 0.6 30.6 4.7 0.08
Costa Rica 1990 7.0 31.5 8.4 40.0 11.4 0.53
2010 15.3 40.3 2.6 43.7 8.9 0.22
Mexico 1990 7.8 24.1 4.5 29.2 7.4 0.39
2010 10.6 35.8 0.7 41.2 7.5 0.05
Hungary 1996 8.8 9.8 0.2 16.0 1.7 0.07
2010 12.5 15.2 0.2 20.1 2.2 0.06
All poverty measures are expressed in %. Mean income is expressed in $ a day
(2005 PPP). P a corresponds to the contribution of absolutely poor individuals
to PEL, defined in (4). Source: PovcalNet.
The World and urban China experienced a large decline in income poverty
over the period: PEL dropped by 42% and 75%, respectively. In other words,
in spite of the increase in income inequality, particularly important in urban
China as indicated by HCRL, PEL concludes unambiguously that growth has
been poverty reducing.24 These reductions reflect primarily the changes in ab-
solute poverty. Absolute poverty was a main concern in both entities in 1990,
as confirmed by the values in the last column of Table 3. In the World for
example, 43% of individuals were absolutely poor in 1990 and these individuals
contributed to 82% of PEL. In 2010, only 20.8% of individuals remained abso-
lutely poor in the World, contributing then to 66% of PEL. For urban China,
absolute poverty has been almost eradicated over the period. The decrease in
PEL in both entities is driven by the large decrease in P a.
Over the same period, Costa Rica and Mexico experienced a lower reduction
in poverty than the World and urban China. PEL dropped by 22% in Costa
Rica whereas it returned to its initial value in Mexico. The increase in relative
poverty mitigated the significant reduction in absolute poverty achieved by the
23The figures for the World are an aggregate of the figures for the low- and middle-income
countries, weighed by their population. The figures for urban China are based on an endoge-
nous threshold computed for the mean income in urban China.
24It is the intra-country inequality that is accounted for when discussing the evolution of
inequality in the World.
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two countries. Absolute poverty was an important concern in 1990 – 53% of
PEL for Costa Rica and 39% of PEL for Mexico – although not as dominant as
for the World and urban China. The fraction of absolutely poor individuals fell
from 8.4% to 2.6% in Costa Rica and from 4.5% to 0.7% in Mexico. At the same
time, the large increase in inequality in these two countries implied that more
individuals were poor in 2010 than in 1990, as shown by HCEL. In Mexico, the
large increase in inequality increased significantly P r and the reduction in P a
only compensated for the increase in P r.
Hungary experienced a 30% increase of PEL over the period 1996 – 2010,
in spite of an increase of 43% of its mean income. Absolute poverty was not
an important concern in 1996 – P a was less than 10 % of PEL in 1996 – and
did not change significantly over the period. On the contrary, income inequal-
ity increased and 20% of individuals were poor in 2010 whereas only 16 % of
individuals were poor in 1996. The increase in PEL is directly driven by the
increase in P r.
Analyzing with PEL several unequal growth experiences has shown that very
different conclusions can be drawn by this measure. Different factors influence
the conclusions of PEL, such as the extents of growth and increase in inequality.
A key factor is the importance for PEL of absolute poverty at the beginning of
the period. If absolute poverty is not an important concern, like in Hungary,
the increase in inequality entails an increase in PEL.
The distinction between absolutely and relatively poor individuals and the
decomposability of the index make it possible to separately track these two
forms of poverty and aggregate them in a coherent way. I illustrate this pos-
sibility for the case of urban China, shown in Figure 4. In urban China in
1990, 23.4% of individuals were absolutely poor and 37.8% were relatively poor,
adding up to 61.2% of poor individuals. Overall, the poverty index for the in-
come distribution in 1990 takes a value of 18.9%. This value of income poverty
can be decomposed into the contribution of absolutely poor individuals (11.8%)
and that of relatively poor individuals (7.1%). Hence, absolutely poor individ-
uals contributed to 62% of income poverty, which shows that absolute poverty
was the main issue in urban China in 1990. In 2010, 0.6% of individuals were
absolutely poor and 30% were relatively poor, adding up to 30.6% of poor indi-
viduals. Overall, the poverty index for the income distribution in 2010 takes a
value of 4.7%, a figure 75% lower than that of 1990. This lower value of income
poverty can be decomposed into the contribution of absolutely poor individuals
(0.4%) and that of relatively poor individuals (4.3%). Hence, absolutely poor
individuals contributed to 8% of income poverty. This demonstrates that the
reduction in absolute poverty is responsible for most of this three-quarters re-
duction in income poverty. Moreover, it shows that relative poverty became the
main issue in urban China in 2010.
Altogether, PEL confirms that poverty reduction has been impressive over
the last decades in low- and middle-income countries (“the World” in Table 3).
In fact, poverty decreased even more than Head-Count based measures suggest.
Over the period 1990-2010, even if the fraction of poor individuals decreased
only by 25% , PEL concludes that income poverty was reduced by 42%.
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Figure 4: Evolution of income poverty between 1990 and 2010 in urban China
as measured by PEL. The left graph show the decomposition of poor individuals
(HCEL) between absolutely poor (HCAL) and relatively poor. The right graph
shows the decomposition of PEL between the contribution of absolutely poor in-
dividuals (P a) and that of relatively poor individuals (P r). Source: PovcalNet.
6 Concluding remarks
Comparing income poverty between societies with different standards of living
has always been done with extreme caution. This caution follows in part from
the inability of standard indices – such as the popular Head-Count Ratio or
Poverty Gap Ratio – to weigh in a plausible way the absolute and relative aspects
of income poverty. I propose an alternative way to weigh these two aspects
and use it to derive a new index. Because its individual poverty comparisons
are more in line with standard intuitions, this new index provides a firmer
foundation for poverty comparisons when standards of living differ.
There are several direct applications for this research. A prominent example
is the measurement of income poverty by the World Bank. This institution re-
cently established a commission aimed at advising it on the best way to monitor
the realization of its twin goals.25 The decomposition of the new index between
absolute and relative poverty should simplify the analysis and the communica-
tion on the progress achieved towards its twin goals. In the same vein, the EU
Commission could integrate a measure based on the new index into its AROPE
measure. Also, countries whose official income poverty definition is judged non-
25The Commission on Global Poverty was established in 2015.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/commission-on-global-poverty.
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satisfactory could find interest in the new index. The United States constitute
a prominent example as several observers like Ruggles (1990) and Citro and
Michael (1995) questioned its absolute line. See Blank (2008) for a review of
the political initiatives that have attempted to modify it.
Switching the poverty measure changes the evaluation of policies aimed at
reducing poverty. Traditionally, policy makers use absolute measures for policy
evaluation in low- and middle-income countries and relative measures in high-
income countries. This practice ensures that the most relevant aspect of income
poverty is captured in each case, at the cost of ignoring the other aspect. The
limitation of this practice is that it yields extreme judgments on growth, as
explained in the Introduction. The evaluation of policies with a measure based
on the new index solves these limitations. As a consequence, the policies rec-
ommended by this index are in line with what the specific situation requires
without being extreme.
More generally, the index proposed has applications outside income poverty
measurement. If the emphasis has been put on income, the index can mea-
sure the poverty in any other resource for which both the absolute and relative
aspects matter, like education or health.
7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Before proving each claim in turn, I study the restrictions that each property
imposes on poverty indices in the extended FGT family.
Let the partial derivative of a function f : Rn → R in the direction i at
point x ∈ Rn be denoted by ∂if(x). Monotonicity in Income requires that for
all y ∈ Y and all i ≤ q we have:
∂iP (y) ≤ 0.
Remember that P (y) = 1
n
∑
i d(yi, y) and that we have ∂iy =
1
n
. By chain
derivation, we have that Monotonicity in Income is satisfied if and only if for
all y ∈ Y and all i ≤ q we have:
∂1d(yi, y) +
1
n
n∑
j=1
∂2d(yj , y)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L5
≤ 0. (5)
Conditions (5) relies on partial derivatives of function d. Given its exponen-
tial form and the definition in two parts of er, we have that for all y ∈ Y and
all i ≤ q the partial derivative with respect to own income is:
∂1d(yi, y) = −
α
z(yr)
(
1−
er(yi, y)
z(yr)
)1−α
if yi < z
a, (6)
and26
∂1d(yi, y) = −
α
z(yr)
(
1−
er(yi, y)
z(yr)
)1−α
z(yr)− za
z(y)− za
if za ≤ yi. (7)
26If yi = za, the partial derivative is not well-defined if z(y) 6= z(yr). I have defined in
equation (7) this partial derivative to be ∂1d(yi, y) := limx→za+ ∂1d(x, y).
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Regarding the partial derivative with respect to mean income, we have that for
all y ∈ Y and all i ≤ q:
∂2d(yi, y) = 0 if yi ≤ z
a, (8)
and
∂2d(yi, y) = −s(y)
z(yr)− za
z(y)− za
∂1d(yi, y) if z
a < yi. (9)
Observe that if yi = z(y) and s(y) > 0, then ∂2d(yi, y) > 0.
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In turn, Weak Transfer requires that function d is convex in yi at all y ≥ 0.
That is, for all y ∈ Y and any two i, j ≤ q with yi < yj we have:
28
∂1d(yi, y) ≤ ∂1d(yj , y). (10)
Using conditions (5) and (10) and the expressions for the partial derivative
of function d, I prove each claim in turn.
First, I prove claim 1: an index P in the extended FGT family satisfies
Monotonicity in Income only if α = 1. The proof is case by case.
• Case 1: 0 < α < 1.
Consider any y ∈ Y with q ≥ 2 and y = y∗ such that z(y∗) ≤ y∗ and
s(y∗) > 0. As the line z is monotonic, this y∗ exists. When the income of
individual 1 increases marginally, we have that
L5(y) ≥ ∂1d(y1, y) + ∂2d(yq, y),
because ∂2d(yj , y) ≥ 0 for all j < q. As α < 1 and s(y
∗) > 0, we have
from equations (9) and (7) that
lim
x→z(y∗)−
∂2d(x, y) =∞.
For a fixed y1, there exists hence a value of yq sufficiently close to z(y
∗)
such that
L5(y) ≥ ∂1d(y1, y) + ∂2d(yq, y) > 0,
and hence condition (5) is violated. Hence, Monotonicity in Income does
not hold.
• Case 2: 1 < α.
This case is plagued with the reversed problem. Consider any y ∈ Y with
y = y∗, q ≥ 2 and yq−1 > z
a. Last requirement implies that individual q−1
is relatively poor. When the income of individual q increases marginally,
we have again
L5(y) ≥ ∂1d(yq, y) + ∂2d(yq−1, y).
27Its expression is defined in equation (9) as limx→z(y)− ∂2d(x, y).
28If yj = za, the definition of the partial derivative adopted above by equation (7) is
not relevant. In this particular case, the value returned by equation (6), corresponding to
∂1d(yj , y) := limx→za− ∂1d(x, y), is relevant.
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As α > 1, we have from equation (7) that
lim
x→z(y∗)−
∂2d(x, y) = 0.
As yq−1 > z
a and s(y∗) > 0, we have that ∂2d(yq−1, y) > 0. Again, for yq
sufficiently close to z(y∗), we have
L5(y) ≥ ∂1d(y1, y) + ∂2d(yq, y) > 0,
and condition (5) is violated. Hence, Monotonicity in Income does not
hold.
• Case 3: α = 0.
Index P is the Head-Count Ratio. Monotonicity in Income is violated for
any y ∈ Y with q < n and y = y∗ and one non-poor individual i has
income yi = z(y), as shown in Table 1.
Second, I prove claim 2. I show first that an index P in the extended FGT
family with α = 1 satisfies Weak Transfer if and only if yr = 0. When α = 1,
equations (6) and (7) simplify. We have that for all y ∈ Y and all i ≤ q:
∂1d(yi, y) = −
1
z(yr)
if yi < z
a, (11)
and29
∂1d(yi, y) = −
1
z(yr)
z(yr)− za
z(y)− za
if za ≤ yi. (12)
From equations (11) and (12), condition (10) is satisfied, and hence Weak
Transfer , if and only if we have for all y ≥ 0 that
z(yr) ≤ z(y).
Given line z is monotonic, this implies yr = 0. Observe that if z is such that
s(y) = 0 for all y ∈ [0, a) with a > 0, then taking any yr ∈ [0, a) yields a poverty
index equivalent to that obtained when selecting yr = 0.
Finally, I show that if P is a poverty index in the extended FGT family with
α = 1 and yr = 0, then it satisfies both properties. I have just shown that P
satisfies Weak Transfer since yr = 0. There remains to show that P satisfies
Monotonicity in Income.
Condition (5) can be simplified using equation (8). Monotonicity in Income
is satisfied if and only if for all y ∈ Y and all i ≤ q we have:
∂1d(yi, y) +
1
n
n∑
j=qa+1
∂2d(yj , y) ≤ 0. (13)
As yr = 0 and z is monotonic, equations (11) and (12) imply that for all
i ≤ q and all j ≤ q that are relatively poor (qa < j ≤ q) we have that
∂1d(yi, y) ≤ ∂1d(yj , y).
29The same remark as the one made before equation (7) applies.
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As by assumption s(y) ≤ 1 for all y ≥ 0, equation (9) implies that for all j
with qa < j ≤ q we have that
∂1d(yj , y) ≤ −∂2d(yj , y).
The two last inequalities implies together that for all i ≤ q and qa < j ≤ q
we have that
∂1d(yi, y) ≤ −∂2d(yj , y).
Since n ≥ n− qa, we have that condition (13) holds. Hence P satisfies both
properties.
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